

Crypto for ~~Crypto~~ Computational Number Theory:
Certifying Giant Nonprimes

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Giant Prime Numbers

- GIMPS and PrimeGrid: large-scale projects dedicated to searching giant prime numbers
- Expensive project (Mersenne)  Proth,

- Prevent cheating
 - Double checking
 - Cryptographic



PrimeGrid Mega Primes

Page 1 of 2 > [Last page](#)

	Prime	Digits	Discoverer	Team	Date
1	$10223 \cdot 2^{31172165} - 1$	9,383,761 (decimal)	SyP (primes)		2016-10-31 22:13:54 UTC
2	$1963736^{1048576} + 1$	6,598,776 (decimal)	tng (primes)	Antarctic Crunchers	2022-09-24 15:01:43 UTC
3	$1951734^{1048576} + 1$	6,595,985 (decimal)	apophise@jisaku (primes)	Team 2ch	2022-08-09 11:56:02 UTC
4	$202705 \cdot 2^{21320516} + 1$	6,418,121 (decimal)	Pavel Atnashev (primes)	Ural Federal University	2021-11-25 03:19:26 UTC

Proth Numbers


$$N = k2^n + 1$$
$$n \in \mathbb{N}, k < 2^n \text{ odd}$$

Proth's Theorem

For all x quadratic non-residue mod N :

$$N \text{ prime} \Leftrightarrow x^{k2^{n-1}} = -1 \pmod{N}$$

Proofs of Exponentiation



- If $\text{ord}(G)$ is known: \mathcal{P} and \mathcal{V} compute $e := q^T \bmod \text{ord}(G)$ and x^e
- \mathcal{P} performs T sequential exponentiations

$$x \rightarrow x^q \rightarrow x^{q^2} \rightarrow x^{q^3} \rightarrow \dots \rightarrow x^{q^T}$$

- Cost of computing and verifying the proof $\ll T$

PoEs for (Non-)Primality Certificates?

Proth's Thm: $N = k2^n + 1$

$$N \text{ prime} \Leftrightarrow x^{k2^{n-1}} = -1 \pmod N$$

- GIMPS and PrimeGrid deployed Pietrzak's PoE to certify primality test
 - BUT: Pietrzak's PoE constructed for hidden order groups
 - Here: order of \mathbb{Z}_N^* known for N prime
- Attack!

Our contribution

Statistically sound certificate of **non-primality** for **Proth numbers** that


- reduces the complexity of double checking from n to $O(\lambda \log n)$
- increases the complexity of the currently deployed (not cryptographically sound) protocol by multiplicative factor 2

Technical Overview

Plan


1. Pietrzak's PoE
2. An attack in Proth number groups
3. Our protocol

Interactive Protocols



- **Soundness:** If statement is false, \mathcal{V} rejects w.h.p. for every malicious \mathcal{P}
- **Completeness:** If statement is correct and \mathcal{P} is honest, \mathcal{V} accepts w.h.p.

Pietrzak's PoE [Pie19]



$\tilde{x}^2 = \tilde{y}$? → accept/reject

Can be made non-interactive using Fiat-Shamir.

The Attack [BBF18]

Let $N = k2^n + 1$ prime
 $\Leftrightarrow x^{k2^{n-1}} = -1 \pmod N$



$$x^{k2^{n-1}} = -\alpha$$

Element of order d

$$\alpha$$



$r \leftarrow \$$

$$\left(\alpha \right)^r$$

Holds if $\alpha^{\tilde{r}} = 1 \pmod N$


g_2

...

$\rightarrow \Pr[\mathcal{V} \text{ accepts that } N \text{ is composite}] \geq 1/d$

Our Work: Observations

$$\begin{aligned} N &= k2^n + 1 \text{ prime} \\ \Leftrightarrow x^{k2^{n-1}} &= -1 \pmod N \end{aligned}$$



Observations:

- \mathcal{V} only needs to exclude that the correct result is -1
 - Success probability of attack depends on order of α
 - The order of α divides $N - 1 = k2^n$ if N prime
- \mathcal{V} can check if the order of α is “too small”

Our Work: Non-primality Certificate

$$N = k2^n + 1 \text{ prime} \\ \Leftrightarrow x^{k2^{n-1}} = -1 \pmod N$$

$$x^{k2^{n-1}} = -\mu \neq 1$$

Statistical security parameter

Case 1: $\mu^k = 1$

Case 2: $\mu^{k2^{\lambda \log n}} \neq 1$

Case 3: $\mu^{k2^{\lambda \log n}} = 1$

[HHK+22]



Compute $a := 2^{-n} \pmod k$
and check if $x^k = \mu^{2a}$

Pietrzak's PoE

y , Pietrzak's PoE for claim $x^{k2^{n-1-\lambda \log n}} = y$

Check if $y^{2^{\lambda \log n}} = -\mu$



→ accept/reject

→ accept/reject

→ accept/reject

Summary and Open Problems

Approach	Sound?	Prover's Complexity	Prover's Space	Verifier's Complexity	Proof Size
Double checking	yes	0	0	n	0
Pietrzak's PoE in \mathbb{Z}_N^*	no	$2\sqrt{n}$	\sqrt{n}	$3\lambda \log n$	$\log n$
Our work	yes	$2 \log k + \lambda \log n + 2\sqrt{n}$	\sqrt{n}	$\log k + 5\lambda \log n$	$\log n + 1$

weeks

- We construct non-primality certificate for Proth number $k2^n + 1$
- Open: Construct cryptographically sound certificate of **primality**
- Open: Certificates of (non-)primality for other types of numbers such as Mersenne numbers $2^n - 1$

hours



Questions?